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Abstract: Singapore’s regionalization program is centred on a number of industrial township 
developments in China, India and several Southeast Asian countries. These townships are led by 
Singapore government-linked companies and are premised on the perception that Singapore’s positive 
reputation with multinational corporations, for efficient industrial infrastructure and stable, corrupt-free 
administration, will give the townships a marketing advantage. Their progress is a litmus test of 
Singapore’s ability to export its efficiency in industrial park development and management outside its 
borders. This paper discusses the origins and progress of the four largest and most advanced townships, 
two in Indonesia and two in China. It finds that initial optimism with which the flagship projects were 
unveiled has not been justified.  
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Introduction 
 
The development of industrial townships in China, India and across Southeast Asia was central to 
Regionalization 2000 (R2000), Singapore’s government-led regionalization program commenced in the 
early 1990s. The township projects vary in location, scale, participants and progress. Comparability of the 
individual projects exists because of their common perceived advantage, as well as their shared design 
principles and organisation. The city state’s positive reputation for infrastructure efficiency and corrupt-
free administration was perceived as an advantage over other industrial parks that could be transplanted to 
locations where these attributes are uncertain, such as Indonesia (Server, 1996). Singapore’s linkages to 
both western business, through the large population of MNCs in Singapore, and its ethnic affiliation to 
Chinese business networks that dominate Asian enterprise were thought to augment the marketing 
advantage (Redding, 1990; Yeung, 1997; Brown, 1998).  
 
As well, Singapore operates within the dominant Asian political management style that favours a 
minimum of transparent, legalistic and accountable decision-making processes in preference to 
interpersonal relationships, networking and consensus behind closed doors1. This context enables 
individual investment privileges and protections for the parks to be negotiated, helped by Singapore’s 
relative economic wealth within the region and reputation as an economic role model. The common 
design principle is self-containment with respect to the facilities required for industrial production and the 
focus on attracting foreign branch plants. As far as possible, the aim is to separate the townships from 
dependency on the surrounding administration and infrastructure, reinforcing the goal of creating 
privileged pockets of investment. The shared organisational context is the role of the Singapore 
government-linked companies as the primary facilitators and lead investors in the townships.  
 
To provide the context to this paper, a brief account of Singapore’s regionalization initiative, how it links 
to earlier development initiatives and how it relates to Singapore's current stage of development is 
presented. This is followed by case studies of the largest and most advanced of the township projects: 
Batamindo Industrial Park and Bintan Industrial Estate in Indonesia, and China-Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park and Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park in China’s Jiangsu province (Figure 1). The final 
section considers the implications of the experiences for the future of Singapore’s regionalization 
program, including how this has been affected post-1997. 
                                                          
1
 The favored mechanisms include familiarization tours, formal and informal contacts amongst counterparts, the 
constitution of ad-hoc problem-solving committees, and visits by ministerial delegations that emphasize 
interpersonal relationships (Kumar and Siddique, 1994)  
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Regionalization and the Singapore Economy 
 
By the mid-1980s, rising business costs made it an imperative for the country to move out of labor-
intensive activities and become a regional centre of advanced technology (Rodan, 1989; Regnier, 1991). 
A new internationalization strategy was hatched that sought to strengthen local enterprise. An overseas 
direct investment program was launched in 1988 to accelerate access to new technology and foreign 
markets through joint ventures with overseas companies in Europe and North America. Over S$1.2 
billion was invested; most of these investments, however, proved unsuccessful partly because of the 
weakness of the Singaporean partners (Kanai, 1993; Yeung, 1998). The government then began to look 
for expansion within the Asian region, encouraged by the liberalisation of foreign investment controls 
occurring in neighboring countries (Perry, 1991; Parsonage, 1992; Yeoh et al, 1992; Toh and Low, 1993; 
Ho and So, 1997; Grundy-Warr et al, 1999). In 1993, the change from internationalization to 
regionalization was endorsed by the Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas (Singapore Ministry of 
Finance, 1993).  
 
The regionalization strategy comprised state-led infrastructure projects and a range of incentives and 
regulatory innovations designed to assist private companies and individuals move overseas. First, senior 
politicians negotiate the institutional framework for the project that typically involves pursuit of special 
investment conditions and participation from government-linked agencies in the host location (Yeung, 
1998). These inter-governmental arrangements were intended to result in privileged foreign investment 
zones but, as will be discussed below, inadvertently exposed the parks to particular dependencies and 
challenges. Second, Singapore government agencies and government-linked companies (GLCs) are the 
prime investors in the infrastructure and real estate development, typically through government-led 
consortia (Singapore Economic Development Board, 1994, 1995; Kwok, 1996). The prominence of 
government agencies and GLCs reflects the scale and long payback periods for infrastructure, which may 
make the investment unattractive to private companies alone. GLCs have the resources and experience 
required from their dominance of infrastructure provision in Singapore. As well, the government 
preference is to be an active participant in the projects, partly justifying its authoritarian political regime 
on the basis of its direct responsibility for the state’s economic growth. The third role played by the state 
is in the marketing and promotion of the parks.  The parks are heavily promoted to foreign multinationals 
in Singapore, as well as to Singapore companies seeking to internationalize their operations. The 
Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB) takes on this role as part of its broader strategy for 
encouraging foreign MNCs to make Singapore their regional support and headquarters location. The ideal 
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is that low value activities are relocated to one of Singapore’s overseas parks alongside expansion of high 
value regional support activities in Singapore (Figure 2).  
 
Numerous bilateral business councils involving Singapore and individual overseas governments are used 
to promote the parks to new foreign investors. Initial investor interest in the first Singapore-developed 
overseas industrial park - Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) - further encouraged expanding overseas 
projects further into the region, especially to China, India, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (Tan, 
1995). No precise objectives for the regionalization program have been made public against which its 
progress can be measured, but it is clear that the plans were ambitious. In 1994, it was announced that 
initially 2-3 percent of the republic's financial reserves would be directed to infrastructure projects in 
Asia, and this share could grow to 30-35 percent within 10-15 years (Kwok, 1996). This indicated the 
high confidence in the projects’ viability as previously public investment had been only in blue chip 
stocks and bonds in industrialized economies. The scale of the four flagship projects considered below, if 
their development potential is realised, would exceed the total industrial and warehousing land area in 
Singapore.  
 
The Indonesian Parks 
 
The parks on the neighboring Riau islands of Batam and Bintan were the first of the government-linked 
projects to make progress. BIP was opened in 1992 with BIE opened in 1994. The parks are broadly 
identical, although Bintan has the potential to be a significantly larger project. Both were envisaged as 
self-contained environments with their communication and business linkages through Singapore rather 
than through Indonesia. BIP, for example, has its own power supply, water treatment plant, sewerage 
system, telecommunications facilities, commercial centre with a market, shops, a bank, restaurants, 
supermarkets, a mosque and a 24-hour medical centre. Factories of various sizes are built in advance for 
rent or purchase. BIP also has its own shipping and warehouse provider, offering freight transportation to 
and from Singapore. Labor recruited from outside Batam, on two-year contracts, reside in the park. 
Outside the estate, Batamindo Executive Village provides accommodation and recreation facilities for 
professional staff. BIE replicates BIP’s design and organisational attributes with the additional feature of 
having its own port and direct ferry connection to Singapore.  
 
Self-containment was partly a response to limited infrastructure and population on the islands.  Prior to 
BIP, Batam remained sparsely populated. In 1989, total employment on Batam was 11,000, mainly 
concentrated in local services, tourism and oil-related firms using Batam as a service base (Batam 
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Industrial Development Authority, 1991). Tanjong Pinang, Bintan’s only urban centre, and Riau’s 
administrative centre, had a population of 200,000 in 1990 but little manufacturing employment. In Riau 
province as a whole, less than 10 percent of the population had a monthly expenditure of above US$20 in 
1995 (Peachey et al., 1998). The parks act as investment enclaves bringing Singapore development 
standards to a low-income economy. 
 
The projects on Batam and Bintan were joint ventures between government-linked companies from 
Singapore and an Indonesian business conglomerate. Singapore participated through two GLCs: 
Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now SembCorp Industries) and a subsidiary of Jurong 
Town Corporation (JTC), Singapore’s main industrial infrastructure builder. The Indonesian partner was 
the Salim Group, one of Indonesia’s major conglomerates that, under the then Suharto regime, enjoyed 
close links to senior politicians and privileged access to investment projects in Batam and Bintan. Salim 
provided a guarantee of priority with respect to regulatory controls and government permissions, and took 
charge of labor recruitment. The Singapore contributors took control of the design, physical development 
and management of the estate. This division of responsibilities puts Singapore at the front of the 
marketing effort, to exploit its reputation for efficiency and links to foreign MNCs (Yeoh et al, 1992).  
 
Batamindo Industrial Park 
 
In the late 1980s, Singapore’s economic planners identified the nearby Indonesian island of Batam as a 
possible solution to some of the city-state’s pressing land and resource constraints. The conditions for this 
were the rapid recovery of the manufacturing sector, after the mid-decade recession, and the negotiation 
of a number of concessions in the Indonesian government’s foreign investment regulations. The 
investment concessions made Batam an easier and more secure investment location for multinational 
capital than other parts of Indonesia. Foreign companies in Batam were exempted from the need to 
devolve a share of ownership to Indonesian partners and the island’s duty free status was amended to 
facilitate a proportion of output to be exported to other parts of Indonesia. Foreign companies were 
allowed to manage industrial estates, providing the opportunity for the Singapore GLCs to set up the joint 
venture to develop and manage BIP. 
 
Singapore’s vision for Batam differed from the Indonesian ambition of creating a diversified modern 
metropolis comparable to Singapore (Regnier, 1991; Peachy et al., 1998). Singapore’s economic planners 
envisaged Batam as a relocation point for low value assembly activity. Indonesia’s compromise came due 
to the initial dearth of foreign investments in Batam, and the expectation that BIP would stimulate further 
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investments under the larger growth triangle initiative to which it became linked (Perry, 1991; Yeoh, 
1993). 
 
BIP was the eighth industrial estate authorised by the Batam Industrial Development Authority, but the 
first to bring significant industrial activity to Batam outside the offshore oil servicing sector. The first 
tenants arrived in 1991, mainly branches of American, European and Japanese MNCs already operating in 
Singapore including AT&T, Philips, Sumitomo, Smith Corona, Seagate, Sanyo and Thomson. The 
provision of ready built factories for lease was an asset, allowing quick occupation and minimal 
commitment. As well, SEDB was active in encouraging leading MNCs in Singapore to use the park. 
SEDB controls access to a wide range of taxation concessions and regulatory permissions in Singapore, 
thus exerting great influence over investors who perceive potential business advantages by co-operating 
with SEDB (Perry, 1995). By June 2002, there were 88 companies and 66,000 workers in the Park (Table 
1A). Table 1B shows BIP’s tenant profile.  
 
The initial area reserved for the park (500 hectares) has been fully committed. An industrial township has 
successfully been developed, but limitations need to be noted:  
 
1.  The scale and character of development has not influenced the restructuring of the Singapore 
economy. The initial promotion of BIP envisioned it making significant contributions to upgrading 
the Singapore economy through managing the outflow of MNC investment and stimulating 
Singapore’s role as a regional headquarters. In practice, the park has become a Japanese electronics 
manufacturing enclave. In June 2002, 42 of the tenants were Japanese companies with Singapore the 
next largest concentration (25), while Europe (15) and the USA (7) had a comparatively low 
presence. This nationality profile has been pronounced from the outset. Batam has filled a niche for 
the development of Japanese production networks in Southeast Asia (Hatch and Yamamura, 1996). 
This raises two issues: the vulnerability to a withdrawal of Japanese investments and the limited 
linkages to the Singapore economy. 
 
2.  The development strategy envisaged a self-contained project with minimal dependency on the 
surrounding environment. In practice, the island's reputation as a boom economy has overwhelmed 
Batam. Almost half of the island’s population, which has more than tripled since 1990, are new 
migrants living in illegal squatter housing, and 50,000 illegal houses are reportedly scattered 
throughout the island (The Straits Times, October 6, 2001). Attracted by their lower cost and 
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avoidance of accommodation responsibilities, around half of BIP’s labor force now resides outside the 
park. This external labor supply has, however, introduced to the park the tensions and social problems 
of squatter settlements. The challenge is to maintain the investment value of BIP, without a shift of 
resources to meet the needs of the local community. 
 
3. The park’s competitiveness has been eroded with the mushrooming of other industrial parks within 
close proximity. Competitor parks, backed by prominent Indonesian politicians, are rapidly developing 
to match BIP standards. Panbil Industrial Park, for instance, is located directly opposite BIP, and 
offers similar factories at competitive rentals. The premium placed on the park’s one-stop support 
service and self-sufficient operating environment is increasingly called into question. 
 
4.  Ownership changes at BIP have also brought about uncertainties. Privileged access to senior 
politicians and policy-makers has been diminished with the `apparent’ change of ownership in BIP 
(and BIE). The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency has reportedly offered to sell the Salim 
Group’s stakes in all the Riau projects – estimated to be worth S$500 million – in a packaged deal 
(The Business Times, August 28, 2001). Further restructuring have taken place, with the three main 
stakeholders now being SCI, Ascendas (a JTC subsidiary) and the Indonesian government. The park’s 
reputation as an investment haven has not been left unscathed by political developments in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, and more recently, the September 11 attacks in the United 
States. BIDA reported that only 63 new projects worth US$325 million were attracted to the island 
between January and August 2001.  
   
Bintan Industrial Estate 
 
Bintan is located 50km southeast of Singapore. The willingness of Indonesian authorities to facilitate the 
BIE project was one of the positive spin-offs of BIP for Singapore. Singapore government agencies were 
able to secure a coastal site for the BIE project, and to reserve a 4,000-hectare site to be developed over a 
decade or more.  Another indicator of this was that BIE secured duty free status, which is not extended to 
Bintan as a whole. BIE has an on-site integrated terminal to handle customs, immigration, quarantine and 
port clearance to expedite the shipment of raw materials and finished goods. More interestingly, while 
BIE is subject to provincial administration, it has been allocated staff from regulatory agencies to 
facilitate the formulaic one-stop approval process. Low land prices have enabled factory rents to be 25 to 
50 per cent lower than BIP and, because of lower living costs, BIE’s wage levels are also below BIP’s. 
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BIE's initial marketing targeted textiles and garments, furniture and other wood processing activities. Of 
the first 11 tenants that commenced operations, eight were garment manufacturers. Garment makers had 
access to Singapore's export quota under the multi-fibre agreement, a concession for foreign companies 
that are usually excluded from Indonesia’s export quota. Access to this quota has since been lost, and 
partly for this reason a new marketing plan for BIE was required. Electronics was added to the marketing 
priorities, as announced in September 1997 at a ceremony where eight electronics firms signed up for 
space. Subsequently, there has been a modest growth in investment, from 23 tenants in 1996 to 30 in mid-
1998 (SEDB Annual Report, 1998), with a total of 33 operating and committed occupants claimed in 
December 1998. Of these 33 firms, 70 percent are Singapore companies (mostly garment makers) with 6 
Japanese electronics firms accounting for over half the remaining occupants. 
 
Of the 4,000 hectares available to BIE, 110 hectares had been developed at a cost of US$113 million. 
Compared with the ultimate workforce originally expected to be in the order of 130,000, by 1997 there 
were only 4,500 employed and 6,000 by mid-1998. In 1997, revised employment projections targeted a 
workforce of 12,000 by 2001. The project itself was scaled down to a 500-hectare development. As at 
June 2002, BIE has 35 tenants and 13,000 workers (Table 2A). The tenant profile is shown in Table 2B. 
 
Even with the recent increase in occupancy, the intention to develop a 500-hectare township appears 
unrealistic. To begin with, the BIE project was ill-timed. BIE was launched at the same time as 
Singapore’s other flagship projects in China and Vietnam. By then, interest had already shifted to the 
perceived availability of other lucrative options in these emerging markets, and the added attractions of 
their large domestic markets. BIE is thus faced with a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma. Without the benefits of 
a substantial occupancy, it is difficult to attract investors, due to the limited supporting environment, but 
where without more occupants it is hard to improve the operating environment. For the present, BIE is 
neither a significant contributor to the restructuring of the Singapore economy, nor a commercially viable 
project (Perry and Yeoh, 2000).  
 
Land ownership has become a major contentious issue, as land acquired by the Salim Group for joint 
venture projects such as BIE has come under question by regional legislators and local farmers. The 
financial disputes with local villagers and mob protests in Bintan have introduced further uncertainties 
into the long-term viability of BIE. In January 2000, an estimated 1000 villagers stormed into BIE and 
shut down its power generators. Although the Indonesian authorities intervened, several companies had 
already threatened to pull out their investments. In February 2000, the Salim Group was prosecuted for 
alleged illegal land appropriation. The irony is that these developments occurred just a month after 
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Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong unveiled a S$1.2 billion assistance package (including a 
S$400 million regionalization finance scheme) for Indonesia, while leading a 60-member business 
delegation to Jakarta to explore investment opportunities in Indonesia.  
 
More recently, security at BIE has been heightened following the Bali bomb blasts. An inter-ministerial 
ceremony (scheduled for October 18, 2002) to mark the expansion of BIE was cancelled, while 
prospective tenants have reportedly postponed their site visits `indefinitely’. While it is too early to assess 
the financial repercussions, BIE could do without the added uncertainties. 
 
In addition, regional autonomy laws (nos. 22 and 25 of 1999) have added uncertainties to the operating 
environment of the two parks. Officially implemented in 2001, foreign companies now have to deal with 
the provincial and sub-provincial governments much more intensively than they did before. Our on-site 
interviews2 with executives and tenants, at both parks, have confirmed this new development. Preliminary 
evidence points to a more complex regulatory environment. 
 
The Chinese Parks 
 
In physical design, the two industrial townships at Suzhou and Wuxi, follow the pattern of BIP and BIE.  
The administrative context, on the other hand, differs. In BIP and BIE, the Indonesian partner (Salim 
Group) is a private company whereas in China the Singapore investors worked with government agencies. 
Another difference is the complexity of the administrative and regularity environment in China compared 
with Indonesia. In Indonesia’s highly centralised political system, the endorsement from senior national 
politicians provided a degree of administrative certainty further strengthened by their protection of the 
main commercial partner in the projects. In China, the projects had to contend with multiple tiers of 
government administration and competition within the tiers during a time of economic and political 
change. The motivation for the projects in China is also more diffused than in Indonesia. In the latter, the 
primarily concern had been to promote the restructuring of the Singapore economy, and to exploit the 
complementarities of neighboring economies. The Suzhou project had a political objective to demonstrate 
the strength of the ‘Singapore development model’ and its transferability to other Asian environments. 
Wuxi had narrower economic objectives based on the perception that Singapore agencies have an 
advantage in real estate development in China because of their links to western business, and access to 
Chinese business and political networks. The selection of Suzhou and Wuxi for the projects reflected the 
                                                          
2
 Interviews in BIP and BIE were conducted in July and September 2002, respectively. 
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draw of a province newly opened to wholly foreign-owned companies where the parks would have strong 
prospects of capturing a significant share of inward investments. 
 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) 
 
CS-SIP is Singapore's most controversial overseas township project and China's largest joint venture 
measured both in its total estimated project cost (US$20 billion) and land size (7,000 hectares). CS-SIP 
was conceived as a balanced community, home to a workforce of 360,000 and a total population of 
600,000. As well as providing the full range of urban facilities for its resident population of workers, 
managers, administrators, expatriates and their families, it was also to be the new commercial centre for 
the existing city of Suzhou as well as a commercial centre serving the surrounding area. The ambition for 
CS-SIP reflected the goal of developing a township on a scale to test in China the effectiveness of the 
Singapore approach to social and economic development. This goal was encouraged by China’s former 
premier Deng Xiaoping who, it has been said, regarded Singapore as ‘a capitalist version of the 
communist dream’. In 1992, Deng promoted the idea of learning from Singapore as a way of avoiding the 
environment problems and social disorder that concerned him in southern China. Singapore’s Senior 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew took up this message, and personally took charge of the formalisation of the idea 
into the development of CS-SIP (Cartier, 1995). The development of CS-SIP was sanctioned by the State 
Council on February 11, 1994 and three landmark agreements were signed in Beijing on February 26, 
1994. The Park was formally launched on May 12, 1994.  
  
The Singapore model, as applied to CS-SIP, encompasses methods for attracting and developing the 
commitment of foreign companies. It also involves the delivery of social and welfare services to support 
an efficient and co-operative workforce and a work-orientated community. Attributes thought to attain 
these conditions include welfare provision (encompassing housing, medical and retirement needs) self-
funded through compulsory employee and employer contributions, high quality infrastructure, strict 
pollution control, service reliability, ‘one stop’ non-corrupt decision-making, minimum entry or 
performance regulation and transparent financial charges. To bring these attributes to CS-SIP required a 
large-scale project to facilitate institutional innovation, autonomy from aspects of local government 
control and investment in administrative practice or, as it has become known, ‘software development’ 
(SIPAC, 1998).  
 
CS-SIP was developed by a joint venture between a consortium of Chinese and Singapore-based investors 
known as the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Company (CSSD). The Chinese 
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consortium had a 35 percent stake in CSSD shared amongst 12 organizations, mainly national state-
owned enterprises together with Suzhou city and Jiangsu province (in which Suzhou is located) 
investment companies. The Singapore consortium had a 65 percent stake in CSSD shared amongst 24 
organizations, mainly Singapore government-linked agencies and companies, including SEDB Investment 
and JTC International, as well as two organizations that also participated in other parks - SembCorp 
Industries and the Salim Group (through a subsidiary, KMP China Investments). The two consortia retain 
their separate identity and responsibilities with projects taken up by participants according to their 
expertise and agreed roles. The work of CSSD is overseen by a specially created local authority, the 
Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC). Inter-governmental interest remains through 
a joint steering council co-chaired China’s Vice-premier Li Lanqing and Singapore’s Deputy Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong. 
 
CS-SIP was launched amidst great fanfare. Singapore’s optimism about the project was encouraged by a 
series of advantages secured at the outset of the project. CS-SIP is located in Jiangsu province, which was 
selected in the early 1990s for accelerated economic development to offset the concentration of foreign 
investment in the SEZs (Yang, 1997). The township was afforded preferential policies, comparable to 
those in China’s Special Economic Zones. Finally, its unique status as an inter-governmental 
development initiative was believed to add security against the political risks of investing in China.  
 
Since the inception of CS-SIP, limits to the perceived advantages have become apparent. The significance 
of the inter-governmental endorsement of the project has been reduced by the influence over the project at 
the municipal and provincial level. SIPAC, a new local government authority set up to administer the 
development district, was placed under the authority of Suzhou municipality which oversees other local 
authorities with competing industrial estates. Direct competition is greatest with Suzhou New District, a 
project affiliated to the Suzhou municipal government that similarly aims to create a diversified township 
of modern industry, commerce and housing (The Straits Times, May 14, 1999). 
 
The development of the New District commenced prior to CS-SIP, and it continues to be favoured for 
commercial and housing development as well as by foreign investors. It has advantages in lower labor 
costs, proximity to the airport and its adaptation of CS-SIP’s ‘one-stop service’ model. It claims to 
process business licence applications in 10 working days matching CS-SIP, somewhat reducing the 
impact of its software investment. Another institutional innovation copied in the New District was the 
establishment of a ‘green lane’ to enable import clearance in the district rather than at the trans-shipment 
port. Moreover, the province’s wealth means that there are comparatively high standards of infrastructure 
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and environmental control throughout the province. This reduces the scope for CS-SIP to differentiate 
itself through its physical design and management.       
 
By mid-1998, it was claimed that projects with a total potential value of US$3.4 billion had been 
attracted, including 88 manufacturing operations with an average project value of US$30 million (SEDB, 
1998). While the value of manufacturing investment had been close to target, the overall rate of progress 
of the project did not meet Singapore’s expectations especially with respect to residential and commercial 
development. The extent of Singaporean disappointment was indicated by Senior Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew’s public questioning of the commitment of the Chinese partners to the project (The Straits Times, 5 
December 1997). 
 
Singapore’s frustration has been greatest over the limited progress of housing and commercial projects. 
At the end of 1998, there were only around 1,000 residents in the township and a total workforce of 
6,000. The slow rate of development represented a financial loss to the Singapore consortium, which had 
principally funded the initial land development and infrastructure facilities. As well, there were costs 
faced by Singaporean investors, in executive housing, retail and other services, who were drawn to the 
township in expectation of the project’s rapid development. Singaporean investors reportedly lost US$77 
million over seven years of operations. Significantly, there is also a political cost in the suggestion that 
Singapore was naive in perceiving that it would obtain a special status in China (The Economist, January 
3, 1998).  
 
In June 1999, acrimony with the Suzhou municipal authorities finally culminated in an announcement that 
Singapore would reduce its involvement in the project, and transfer majority ownership of CS-SIP to the 
Chinese consortium from 2001 (The Straits Times, 30 June, 1999). CS-SIP had, by then, attracted 133 
projects. More than 91 international firms had started operations and 14,000 jobs created. These 
investments have provided a basis from which the township should grow. In January 2001, the Singapore 
consortium reduced its stake in CS-SIP to 35%. 
 
Interestingly, investments began to pour in thereafter. By August 2002, the park had attracted 395 
investment projects worth over US$12.4 billion and created employment for 44,000 workers (Table 3). 
The park has since become a foreign investment hub, with foreign enterprises linked to Fortune 500 
companies. CSSD has plans to be listed by 2004 as well as to build an international standards high-tech 
park. Plans are in the pipeline for the completion of the second and third phase of the main transport 
network and basic infrastructure development within the park. 
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Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park (WSIP) 
 
WSIP is a real estate development without the broader diplomatic objectives of CS-SIP. It has the 
potential to cover up to 10 km2 making it a smaller project than CS-SIP. It is also less ambitious in being 
instigated as a real estate development without the political overtones of CS-SIP.  Development of WSIP 
commenced in 1994, with the official opening of the administration building in 1996. The park is located 
in the Jiangsu Province, 130 km away from Shanghai and 80 km northwest of Suzhou. Wuxi has an urban 
population of 4.3 million population, with a per capita income of around US$2000 which is one of the 
highest amongst Chinese cities.  The park was designated a national high technology development zone as 
part of the Torch Program initiated in 1988. This status defined its focus on electronics and electrical, 
computer and computer peripherals, control systems and instrumentation, precision engineering, 
telecommunications components, medical and healthcare products, automotive and aerospace 
components, and supporting industries. 
  
The basic taxation incentives available to foreign investors match those in CS-SIP, including the 
possibility of a total of 5 years of corporate tax exemption followed by 5 years of reduced tax. WSIP was 
designed for wholly foreign-owned investments and like CS-SIP, there has been an emphasis on 
instigating a ‘one stop’ administrative service to manage approvals and documentation in setting up a new 
enterprise. The park is situated on the edge of Wuxi’s urban district with service facilities, dormitory 
accommodation and an executive village incorporated into its design.  
 
WSIP markets itself based on its strategic location, quality service management, and its first-rate 
infrastructure, telecommunications and transportation networks. The park was originally a 70 percent 
Singapore-owned joint venture with the remaining 30 percent taken up by Wuxi’s municipal government. 
The Singapore consortium was led by SembCorp Industries (SCI), with the other principal investors being 
Temasek Holdings (the Singapore government’s main investment holding company) and the Salim/KMP 
Group. Wuxi municipal authority holds interests in other industrial estates, but Singapore officials 
downplayed the direct competition as only WSIP was designed exclusively for wholly foreign-owned 
ventures.  
In contrast to the multiple parties involved in CS-SIP, the Wuxi municipality was the sole Chinese partner 
involved in the project.  Lower land costs were a further advantage and unlike CS-SIP, WSIP was 
negotiated directly with the Wuxi authorities and this direct involvement minimized the polarization 
between higher echelons of the Chinese government and the provincial government.  
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WSIP’s original key investors were mainly MNCs with operations in Singapore, including Siemens 
Components, Seagate Technology, Sumitomo Electric and Matsushita Refrigeration. SEDB’s assistance 
in bringing the first tenants to the park has been acknowledged. Nonetheless, the total investments 
attracted were below that CS-SIP. Notwithstanding WSIP’s focus on high-tech companies, the investment 
profile is relatively low value-added, with a large share of Asian investments. 
  
From a total of US$450 million investment committed in 1996 and 6,000 jobs at the end of 1996, investor 
interest has slowed. Immediate prospects for growth are focused on the possible expansion of the initial 
investors. Higher taxation and duties on imported capital equipment, introduced in 1996, have been a 
challenge to maintaining investor interest in the types of technology-intensive activities that the park is 
designed for. Concessions in this taxation regime were introduced in 1998, but this benefit has been 
overtaken by the uncertainties arising from Asia’s economic crisis.  
 
Exports from WSIP were valued at US$1 billion in 2001 and employment stood at 16,000. WSIP has 
since been developed to its second phase, covering an area of 235 hectares. However, economic viability 
has yet to be achieved. The park had been operating at a loss since its inauguration. WSIP incurred losses 
of S$3.8 million and S$4.3 million in 1998 and 1999, respectively, and only managed to trim its losses to 
S$2.8 million in 2000. In mid-2002, the SCI-led consortium signed an agreement to pare its stake to 49 
percent with effect from 2003. This transfer of shareholding and management control would, according 
SCI officials, result in better “alignment of interests and improve the operating efficiency of the park” 
(The Straits Times, May 14, 2002). SCI has provided for an extraordinary loss of S$48.3 million for its 
loans to the park. 
 
Interestingly, and not unlike CS-SIP, the Chinese partners have recently announced plans to develop the 
third phase of the project, which will double WSIP’s size. It is envisaged that, by granting the Chinese a 
larger interest in WSIP, the park’s performance will turn around in 2002. Suffice to say, even though 
WSIP has not experienced difficulties with the local bureaucracy to the extent of CS-SIP, the handing 
over to Chinese management mirrors the outcome of CS-SIP.  
 
Singapore’s Industrial Townships: Some Reflections 
 
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a comparatively short period of time indicates the ability 
of the city-state to mobilise its economic and political resources. Since the early 1990s, through these 
projects, Singapore has developed an area equivalent to around 20 per cent of the industrial land area 
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managed by the state’s industrial land developer within Singapore. The projects have obtained special 
investment conditions within their overseas localities, and government endorsements further underline 
their significance. Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, substantial challenges remain in securing their 
long-term financial viability. Of the four projects reviewed, only BIP has established itself as a viable 
industrial park, but without delivering the broader goals associated with the regionalization initiative.       
 
In the case of Indonesia3, the rationale for these projects seem to have over estimated the attractiveness of 
low cost production environments for multinational companies (Yeoh, et al., 2000). BIP has increasingly 
become a Japanese investment enclave, with linked Singapore support industries. And in BIE, Japan 
similarly provides the main source of non-Singaporean investment. This concentration partly reflects the 
Japanese’s strategy of taking greater interest in developing regional markets and expending its use as an 
export base, as compared to North American and European companies (Hatch and Yamamura, 1998). 
This is compatible with the low cost production environments of the type offered by BIP and BIE. 
American and European investors have been concerned that the predominantly young, migrate female 
workforce, subject to behavioural controls and isolated dormitory living, may result in a home country 
consumer backlash. 
 
In the case of China, the projects were expected to benefit from the ability of Singapore’s Chinese elites 
to obtain a special status through their ethnic allegiance and dual connections to overseas Chinese and 
western business networks. The experience in Suzhou indicates that while there is an interest in learning 
from Singapore, local officials prefer to deal directly with foreign investors. This outcome accords with 
the assessment of outside observers that China tends increasingly not to view overseas Chinese as 
preferred investors or joint venture partners.  
 
Hong Kong’s reversion to China has given it direct access to overseas capital independent of overseas 
Chinese networks. Also, it is suggested that mainland China may perceive a political advantage in 
avoiding close linkages with overseas Chinese. The diffusion of images such as ‘Greater China’, and 
transnational coalitions of ethnic Chinese with expansionist ambitions, suggest that relations with western 
governments may be best managed by remaining separate from other Chinese communities (Harding, 
1995). 
  
                                                          
3
 The onset of Asia’s financial turmoil has added to the challenges facing the Indonesia parks, but there are reasons 
to suggest that it is not their source (for a more detailed discussion, see Perry and Yeoh, 2000).  
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For projects in both countries, the reliance on personal ties rather than transparent contracts has had its 
advantages and disadvantages. In the case of the Indonesian projects, reliance on the Salim Group was 
necessary in the context of the Indonesian system of ‘crony capitalism’ fostered by then President Suharto 
(Hill, 1996). The end of the Suharto era, and pressure from the IMF and western governments for 
financial transparency, has not immediately severed Salim’s political or commercial influence. Salim has, 
however, been forced to commence a major restructuring to stem financial losses and to search for new 
avenues of investment outside Indonesia (The Straits Times, April 24, 2001). A longer-term uncertainty 
remains associated with the perceived weaknesses in the political leadership, and the continued 
resentment of Chinese-owned businesses amongst segments of Indonesian pribumi community 
(Godement, 1998). In the Suzhou experiment, the limits of relying on personal ties have been most 
immediately encountered, where inter-government endorsement at the top proved insufficient to secure 
equal commitment in the lower tiers of government. Thus, despite claims about Singapore’s politicians 
having achieved a special ‘guanxi’ (relationship) with China to secure the project’s success, when 
Singapore announced its reduced involvement in CS-SIP, Suzhou’s mayor nonchalantly pointed to the 
cultural divide between Singapore and China: 
 
“In our cooperation in the past five years, that we have an MOU to solve our problems is 
because of the cultural differences in the two countries, and the different understanding 
of the items in the documents …” 
      - Chen Deming (quoted in The Straits Times, June 30, 1999).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The comparative success of the industrial parks in Indonesia and China is difficult to judge because each 
faced different challenges and had different opportunities. Evaluative judgments are also complicated by 
the mix of economic and diplomatic goals underlying the projects. In terms of meeting the immediate 
investment goals, BIP has most claim to success (Table 3). This project had the benefit of commencing at 
a point when the Singapore economy was growing strongly, and many of the city-state's larger foreign 
MNCs were seeking new, low cost production locations. The proximity to Singapore was an advantage in 
providing management economies in overseeing the new factories, sharing resources with Singapore 
operations and providing access to the city state's logistic support. The critical role of the Singapore 
government in providing a secure, well-managed industrial site is indicated by the low take up of other, 
and more favorably, located industrial land on Batam. This suggests that geographical proximity is not in 
itself the draw card. As well, the project had the advantage of a comparatively simple administrative 
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context.  It was brokered between the leaders of two governments, without risk from lower tier 
governments or dependency on larger cross-border arrangements. 
 
BIP is now a well-established real estate project, but has not necessarily achieved all its development 
goals.  It has been a springboard for Singapore-Indonesian co-operation in Riau, but it is not yet clear that 
Singapore has obtained the resource benefits it looked for. BIP may be at risk from the breakdown of the 
township as a separate enclave, and the larger social tensions existing on Batam. The BIE project has 
faced low investor interest, arising both from the increased competition for foreign investment and the 
restricted appeal of its operating conditions. Over the longer term, the political uncertainties and policy 
nuances that radiate from Jakarta are unlikely to add to investor confidence. 
 
WSIP has been affected by changes in the regulation of capital equipment imports by foreign investors, 
reducing the viability of technology-intensive manufacturing for which the project is configured. The CS-
SIP project has attracted a high level of foreign investment, fulfilling the intended niche of 
accommodating high-value projects from investors that are most at risk from administrative uncertainties. 
CS-SIP's problems stem from the lack of priority obtained from its local development partners, many of 
whom are involved in competing developments or are seeking to promote Suzhou as a whole, and not just 
CS-SIP. In retrospect, CS-SIP has experienced greater challenges as the `model’ was subjected to various, 
often incongruous, objectives thus setting the stage for conflicts of interest and discontentment (China 
Online, October 7, 1999).  
     
Singapore’s regionalization program, which follows an earlier and largely unsuccessful 
internationalization initiative, has yet to bring to Singapore the economic benefits intended. For the 
present, Singapore’s overseas industrial parks remain as investment enclaves within a disjointed 
economic and policy environment. They are linked to networks of transnational investment, business 
elites and specific government commitments rather than an overall deepening of regional integration. The 
positive aspect of this is that the parks remain sites of investment privilege, in respect of their regulatory 
controls, infrastructure quality and status with public and private agencies. The weakness is that privileges 
obtained are vulnerable to changes in political allegiances, and the infrastructure efficiency is at risk from 
the uncontrolled external environment.  
 
Finally, it should be recognised that, while the initial optimism with which the R2000 projects were 
unveiled has not been justified, official commitment to the projects remains (The Straits Times, July 2, 
1999), as is the acceptance of an extended time horizon to meet development targets. As long as these 
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projects maintain some ongoing momentum, a judgement of failure or success may not be appropriate 
given their mixed economic and political objectives. 
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      Figure 1: Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks in Indonesia (Riau) and China 
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Figure 2: Transborder Industrialization 
 
 
 
Source: Singapore Economic Development Board, Singapore Unlimited, 1995. 
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            Table 1A: Batamindo Industrial Park - Operational Statistics (as at June 2002) 
 
General Information 
 
Investment by Developer 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Investment by Tenants 
Export Value 
No. of Employees 
 
US$ 470 million 
88 
560,000 m2 
> US$1 billion 
> US$2 billion 
66,000 
 
Tenants by Country of Origin 
 
Japan 
Singapore 
USA 
Germany 
France 
Switzerland 
 
 
42 
25 
7 
3 
2 
2 
 
Finland 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Holland 
Australia 
Malaysia 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
 
 
              Source: SembCorp Industries (http://www.sembcorp.com.sg). 
. 
 
Table 1B: Batamindo Industrial Park - Tenant Profile 
 
 Electronics Electrical Plastic 
Molding 
Precision 
Parts 
Packaging Pharmaceuticals Medical Support Others Total 
Japan 21 8 2 7 2 1 - - 1 42 
Singapore 8 - 7 3 3 - - 1 3 25 
USA 6 - - - - - - - 1 7 
Germany 2 1 - - - - - - - 3 
Australia - - - - 1 1 - - - 2 
France 1 1 - - - - - - - 2 
Switzerland 1 - - - - 1 - - - 2 
Malaysia - - 1 - - - - - - 1 
Denmark - - - - - - - - 1 1 
Finland 1 - - - - - - - - 1 
Holland - - - - - - 1 - - 1 
Sweden - 1 - - - - - - - 1 
Total 40 11 10 10 6 3 1 1 6 88 
 
Source: Batamindo Industrial Park Fact Sheet, June 2002. 
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   Table 2A: Bintan Industrial Estate - Operational Statistics (as at June 2002) 
 
General Information 
 
Investment by Developer 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Investment by Tenants 
Export Value 
No. of Employees 
 
US$113 million 
35 
104,000 m2 
> US$105 million 
> US$283 million 
13,000 
 
Workers’ Profile 
 
Age 
Education 
 
 
Gender 
Marital Status 
 
18 to 30 years 
Senior High (12 years of 
education) 
 
80% Female; 20% Male 
Single 
 
 
Religious Mix 
 
 
Labor Source 
 
70% Muslims 
22% Christians 
8% Others 
Bintan, Batam, islands 
in the Riau province 
Java & Sumatra 
 
 
                 Source: SembCorp Industries (http://www.sembcorp.com.sg). 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2B: Bintan Industrial Estate - Tenant Profile 
 
 
Source: Bintan Industrial Estate Fact Sheet, June 2002. 
 
 Electronics Garment Supporting Precision Precast Total 
Singapore 5 13 3 1 1 23 
Japan 6 - - - - 6 
USA 2 - - - - 2 
Germany 1 - 1 - - 2 
Switzerland 1 - - - - 1 
Taiwan - 1 - - - 1 
Total 15 14 4 1 1 35 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Singapore's Industrial Parks in Indonesia and China 
 
 
Batamindo Industrial Park 
(as at June 2002) 
 
Bintan Industrial Estate  
(as at June 2002) 
 
Scale of project 
 
 
500 ha 
 
 
Scale of project 
(Initial plan: 4000 ha) 
 
500 ha 
Investment commitment 
 
US$470m Investment commitment 
 
US$113m  
No. of investors  88 
 
No. of investors  35 
Total employment 
 
66,000 
 
 
Total employment  
 
13,000 
  
 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
  
 
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park 
 
 
Scale of project 
 
 
7,000 ha 
 
 
Scale of project 
 
1,000 ha 
Investment commitment 
(August 2002) 
US$12.4bn  Investment commitment 
 
US$872m  
No. of investors 
(August 2002) 
395 
 
No. of investors 
(June 2002) 
55 
Total employment 
(August 2002) 
44,000 
 
 
Total employment 
(June 2002) 
 
15,000 
 
 
 
Sources:  Singapore Economic Development Board & SembCorp Industries publications (various issues). 
 
